Saeed Moghadas; ahmad behashti
Volume 5, Issue 2 , November 2014, , Pages 89-112
Abstract
Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism, which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines, and incompatibilism, which claims that those beliefs are incompatible. Compatibilists ...
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Are ‘Divine freedom’ and ‘necessity of His will and action’ compatible? There are two different answers to this theological question: compatibilism, which confirms the compatibility of these doctrines, and incompatibilism, which claims that those beliefs are incompatible. Compatibilists advocate their position through two distinct approaches; the first approach presents five reasons that why necessity of divine will and action are consistent with His freedom, while the second, without arguing directly, claims that incompatibilism implies attribution of contingency to God, so accepting compatibilism is the only way to avoid such a false consequence. These two approaches, however, have not been immune from the criticisms of contemporary incompatibilists. In this article I want to explain compatibilist views and review their contemporary criticisms.
